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1. Among the other Federal Reserve functions, other relevant criteria for determining the
set of banks to be supervised by the Federal Reserve might be lender of last resort and
managing the payments system, in which case the emphasis might be on large institutions
that pose the greatest concern for systemic risk. In fact, many of the proposals to restructure
bank supervision have given supervisory authority over the largest bank holding companies




Supervision and Monetary Policy
Implications for the Design of
Bank Regulatory Structure
Joe Peek, Eric S. Rosengren, and Geoﬀrey M. B. Tootell
The current structure of bank supervision in the United States has evolved
through regulatory competition whereby banks would choose the regulator
that most suited their operations. As a result, bank supervision responsi-
bility has not been closely tied to the institutional function of the supervi-
sor. In this study, we focus on determining which institutions the Federal
Reserve should supervise based on one of its institutional functions: The
Federal Reserve should regulate those banks that provide the greatest syn-
ergies between bank supervision and the conduct of monetary policy.1 We
build on recent research by Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a,b) that
ﬁnds that conﬁdential supervisory information can improve the conduct
of monetary policy. Although that research has established the potential
synergies between bank supervision and monetary policy, the implications
of these synergies for regulatory structure have not been examined. If regu-
latory structure were based on the criterion of which institutions provided
the most useful supervisory information for monetary policy, a very
273diﬀerent set of institutions would be selected than if the criterion were
based solely on the institutions that posed the greatest systemic risk.
A number of plans to reform the bank supervisory and regulatory struc-
ture have been proposed over the past ﬁfty years. Although these propos-
als diﬀer in varying degrees from the current structure (and from each
other), a comparison makes clear that any legislation to alter bank super-
visory responsibilities will likely focus on one or more of the following
three dimensions: charter type, whether a bank is included in a holding
company, and the size of the banking organization. The debate has focused
on these three dimensions more for political than for economic reasons.
This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on an important eco-
nomic consideration that has been largely absent from prior discussions
about redesigning the bank regulatory structure. We examine recent pro-
posals focusing on the extent to which the proposals are likely to assign to
the Federal Reserve regulatory oversight of the set of banks that provides
the most useful information for improving macroeconomic forecasts rele-
vant for monetary policy.
As a benchmark, we review the empirical evidence found in Peek,
Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a) on the extent to which supervisory infor-
mation about the set of all banks improves forecasts of inﬂation and unem-
ployment rates. The percent of bank assets held by those banks that super-
visors deem to be the most troubled is the measure of the information
acquired through bank supervisory responsibilities that is used in these
tests. Next, we investigate the extent to which supervisory information
about the set of banks currently regulated by the Federal Reserve provides
useful information for the conduct of monetary policy. Because the holding
company status of a bank is one of the primary dimensions considered in
many regulatory reform proposals, we consider the set of banks for which
the Federal Reserve serves as primary federal regulator as well as the
broader set of banks included through the Federal Reserve’s bank holding
company (BHC) supervisory responsibilities.
We then analyze four alternative regulatory structures that have been
proposed recently to determine their potential impact on the conduct of
monetary policy. The ﬁrst such reform proposal maintains BHC supervi-
sory responsibilities for the Federal Reserve but eliminates the primary
regulator responsibility over state member banks. The second proposal
limits Federal Reserve supervisory responsibility to only the twenty largest
holding companies (along the lines of the 1994 Treasury proposal) plus
state-chartered member banks. The third proposal considered assigns the
Federal Reserve regulatory responsibility over all state-chartered banks
(along the lines of the 1994 Federal Reserve proposal). This structure ig-
nores the holding company aﬃliation of the banks. The fourth proposal
diﬀers only slightly from the third by taking into account holding company
aﬃliation. Here, the Federal Reserve is assigned regulatory responsibility
274 Joe Peek, Eric Rosengren, and Geoﬀrey Tootell2. In other countries, changes in regulatory structure have been even more extreme, fre-
quently removing the central bank from bank supervisory responsibilities and providing a
single ﬁnancial services regulator for banks, insurance companies, securities ﬁrms, and mu-
tual funds. Countries adopting a single regulator model include the United Kingdom, Korea,
and Japan. Numerous other countries are considering moving to such a model.
over all banks in any BHC that has a state-chartered lead bank, plus any
state-chartered bank not in a holding company.2
Section 8.1 provides some background on bank supervisory structure
and potential synergies between supervisory information and the conduct
of monetary policy. Section 8.2 provides the methodology. Section 8.3 in-
vestigates whether informational synergies vary across sets of banks asso-
ciated with alternative regulatory structure proposals. Section 8.4 dis-
cusses the transferability of supervisory data among regulators. The ﬁnal
section provides some conclusions and policy implications.
8.1 Background
The bank regulatory structure in the United States has evolved into an
unusually intricate interlocking web of supervisory responsibilities. Indi-
vidual banks choose their chartering authority, and in so doing also choose
their bank supervisor. If a bank chooses a national charter, it is regulated
by the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a part of the U.S.
Treasury Department. The OCC regulates many of the largest banks, with
responsibility for over one-quarter of all banks, by number, that account
for more than half of all bank assets.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is an independent
federal agency. In addition to its responsibility for providing deposit insur-
ance, it has supervisory responsibility for all state-chartered banks that are
not members of the Federal Reserve System. The FDIC has responsibility
for approximately 60 percent of all banks, but they account for only about
one-ﬁfth of all bank assets because of their small average size.
The Federal Reserve has responsibility for supervising all state-
chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. The
Federal Reserve is the primary federal regulator for approximately 10 per-
cent of all banks, accounting for less than one-quarter of all bank assets.
However, in addition to its responsibility as the primary regulator of all
state member banks, the Federal Reserve also has supervisory authority
over BHCs. Because most banks are in BHCs, the combination of respon-
sibilities for BHCs and as the primary regulator for state-chartered mem-
ber banks assigns the Federal Reserve supervisory responsibilities for over
three-quarters of banks, representing more than 90 percent of bank assets,
including most large entities.
The BHC supervisory responsibility gives the Federal Reserve access to
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of many of the biggest banks, they nonetheless are actively involved in
joint examinations of lead banks and the holding companies. In fact, it is
required that the examination for the holding company and the lead bank
be coordinated under certain conditions related to the size or the health
of the BHC. Those conditions include the holding company having over
$10 billion in assets and the holding company or lead bank having one
of the two lowest supervisory rating categories (four or ﬁve), or, if their
condition has deteriorated, having a rating of three (BHC Supervision
Manual; available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/
default.htm_bhcsm). In addition, although the exams are expected to be
concurrent, they are expected also to include the “performance of certain
on-site examination activities by examiners from the agencies on a simul-
taneous or coordinated basis so as to enhance cooperation” (BHC Super-
vision Manual). Although in practice the degree of coordination and coop-
eration will vary by regional reserve bank and the associated OCC or
FDIC regional oﬃce, the interagency policy statement on 10 June 1993
made clear that the agencies were expected to strengthen coordination and
cooperation. Thus, the Federal Reserve is required to have hands-on su-
pervision of any large or troubled bank in a holding company.
An additional layer of regulatory oversight is present for state-chartered
banks. Although each state has supervisory powers over the banks it has
chartered, the bank must also follow the regulations of its federal regula-
tor. Thus, the state regulatory agency has overlapping supervisory respon-
sibilities with the bank’s primary federal regulator, either the Federal Re-
serve (state member banks) or the FDIC (nonmember banks). In addition,
the Federal Reserve has supervisory responsibility for all BHCs. In the
extreme, a state-chartered nonmember bank in a holding company would
come under the jurisdiction of three diﬀerent regulators: the state banking
supervisor, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve.
It is debatable whether such a convoluted regulatory structure would be
the structure of choice if one were to organize supervisory responsibilities
from scratch. A number of proposals to reform bank supervision and regu-
lation have been suggested over the past ﬁfty years, and one motivation
underlying these proposals has been to reduce regulatory overlap. Al-
though the proposals vary, and none has resulted in a major restructuring,
the assignment of banks to particular regulators in these proposals has
been based primarily on three considerations: bank charter, bank size, and
whether the bank is in a BHC.
Basing regulatory authority on charter type would be assigning regula-
tors based primarily on historical precedent, because such a split would
not allocate banks to regulators by size of institution, potential to cause
systemic risk, or importance to monetary policy or the payments system.
Prior to 1864, all banks were state chartered, with the exception of the
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were able to issue bank notes partially backed by the banks’ gold and
silver reserves. However, this haphazard system led to the distribution of
a plethora of bank notes and an incentive for banks that got into trouble
to issue more notes than they could redeem. With the large outstanding
government debt from ﬁnancing the Civil War, it was decided to establish
a national currency secured by government bonds and to charter national
banks that could issue bank notes secured by government debt. The OCC
was established in 1864 to charter, supervise, and examine all national
banks. After the establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913, the Fed
had the authority to supervise member banks, which included all national
banks. Thus, supervisory responsibility over national banks was shared
initially by the Fed and the OCC, although that was changed in 1917 be-
cause of turf battles. The result was the elimination of this regulatory over-
lap. The OCC examined national banks, but provided information to the
Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve was given primary regulatory re-
sponsibility for state-chartered banks that were members of the Federal
Reserve System.
The choice between a state or national charter has been left to individual
banks, rather than being tied to achieving particular public policy objec-
tives, such as improving information for the conduct of monetary policy
or reducing systemic concerns. Thus, a bank’s choice is determined by
which charter the bank believes most enhances its proﬁtability. Charter
preferences have been inﬂuenced by numerous factors, including taxes on
bank notes, a regulator’s willingness to allow extended powers, the direct
and indirect costs of bank examinations, and the regulatory authority’s
regulatory and supervisory stance.
Assigning regulatory responsibilities to the Federal Reserve according
to bank size may be related to other central bank responsibilities. Most of
the largest ﬁnancial institutions have substantial interlocking relationships
and are often integral to the functioning of the ﬁnancial markets in which
they specialize. Thus, the central bank’s responsibilities for the discount
window function, for management of the payments system, and for main-
taining orderly ﬁnancial markets and a stable economy would provide an
economic rationale for assigning the central bank supervisory responsibili-
ties for the largest banks. However, large bank size and potential systemic
risks are not synonymous, insofar as some smaller banks are important
niche players in some markets and, as the failure of Penn Square Bank
showed, even relatively small banks can have a signiﬁcant impact on their
larger brethren.
Assigning regulatory responsibilities according to BHC status has both
economic and historical precedents. Although BHCs were ﬁrst formed in
the early 1900s, it was only in the mid-1900s, as holding companies were
formed to avoid interstate and intrastate branching restrictions, that hold-
Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 277ing companies became more popular. In 1956 the Bank Holding Company
Act gave the Federal Reserve supervisory authority over multibank hold-
ing companies, and in 1970 this supervisory authority was extended to
single-bank holding companies. Thus, although a bank’s choice of a hold-
ing company structure is driven by self-interest and is determined primar-
ily by legal considerations (e.g., for tax purposes and to circumvent restric-
tions on forming banking networks and on nontraditional bank activities),
choosing a holding company structure that allows Federal Reserve over-
sight may have some potential economic beneﬁts in a broader public policy
context. Because the largest institutions are in holding companies, Federal
Reserve supervisory responsibilities over these institutions can provide
synergies for the central bank’s responsibilities as lender of last resort,
managing the payments system, and conducting monetary policy.
Most discussions about restructuring bank supervision have focused on
reducing regulatory overlap. However, proposals intended only to reduce
regulatory overlap provide no guidance for evaluating the costs or beneﬁts
of alternative proposals that have one regulator per institution but that are
based on a number of other factors, including charter type, bank size, or
holding company aﬃliation. In part, this absence of a persuasive rationale
for restructuring bank supervision, other than satisfying the goal of reduc-
ing regulatory overlap, has prevented the adoption of a politically palat-
able restructuring proposal.
As far back as 1949, President Truman created a task force to examine
bank supervision. The task force recommended that all federal bank su-
pervision be combined, preferably in the Federal Reserve. A similar con-
clusion was drawn by a private study in 1961 by the Commission on
Money and Credit, which recommended that the supervisory responsibili-
ties of the OCC and the FDIC be transferred to the Federal Reserve. Two
other reports also recommended a single federal regulator, although out-
side the Federal Reserve System. A study commissioned by the House
Banking Committee in 1975 recommended that a single Federal Deposi-
tory Institutions Commission supervise all banks, thrifts, and credit
unions. The Grace Commission reported in 1983 to President Reagan that
a single regulator, the Federal Banking Commission, should be given su-
pervisory responsibility for banks currently regulated by the OCC, the
FDIC, and the Fed. Although the Hunt Commission in 1971 expanded
the proposed number of federal regulators to two (an Administrator of
National Banks and an Administrator of State Banks), the Federal Re-
serve still played no role as a primary supervisor.
In 1984, Vice President Bush provided a blueprint for reform that placed
all national banks and BHCs whose lead bank was a national bank under
a Federal Banking Administration, while placing all state-chartered banks
and BHCs whose lead bank was a state-chartered bank under Federal
Reserve supervision. This proposal eliminated the FDIC as a bank super-
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sury study in 1991 recommended replacing the OCC and Oﬃce of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) with a federal banking agency and placing all state-
chartered banks under Federal Reserve supervision.
The most serious recent attempt to alter bank supervisory responsibili-
ties occurred in 1994. The debate again focused on three major criteria for
determining supervisory authority: charter type, holding company status,
and size of banking organization. The Treasury proposal, which was gen-
erally incorporated into S.R. 1633 and H.R. 1214, recommended the cre-
ation of a single bank regulator with the supervisory responsibilities then
assigned to the OTS, OCC, FDIC, and Federal Reserve. However, the
Federal Reserve would still have shared supervisory responsibility over the
twenty largest BHCs, including conducting exams and initiating enforce-
ment actions. As an alternative, the Federal Reserve proposed that a Fed-
eral Banking Commission be created to supervise all national banks and
thrifts, as well as all banks in holding companies with national banks as
their lead bank. The Federal Reserve would regulate all state-chartered
banks as well as all banks in a holding company with a state-chartered
bank as its lead bank. At the BHC level, the Federal Reserve proposed
two alternatives: placing them all under Federal Reserve supervision or
distributing them according to the charter of the lead bank.
The numerous past proposals highlight that most legislation to alter
bank supervisory responsibilities will likely focus on charter type, size of
bank, whether a bank is included in a holding company, or some combina-
tion of these characteristics. Although numerous economic and political
arguments for regulatory restructuring have been proposed, little empirical
evidence has been provided on the possible costs or beneﬁts of diﬀerent
regulatory designs. This paper examines recent proposals for redesigning
the regulatory structure focusing on the extent to which the proposals are
likely to assign to the Federal Reserve regulatory oversight over the set of
banks that provides the most useful information for improving macroeco-
nomic forecasts relevant for monetary policy.
Such evidence is particularly relevant given that a number of countries
have recently adopted a regulatory structure with a single ﬁnancial ser-
vices regulator outside of the central bank. Although the blurring of geo-
graphic and product characteristics of ﬁnancial institutions has encour-
aged many countries to adopt a single regulator model (United Kingdom,
Japan, Korea), the costs to systemic stability, lender of last resort responsi-
bilities, or synergies with monetary policy have not been quantiﬁed. Al-
though reducing regulatory overlap and inconsistent regulations may be
an important objective, it is important also to understand if possible syner-
gies with other central bank functions might be impaired. In fact, a fre-
quent response to regulatory reform measures has been that the Federal
Reserve needs hands-on experience with banks to fulﬁll its responsibilities
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rience does aﬀect the quality of information, then one important concern
when deciding who the Federal Reserve should regulate would be whether
the institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve provide the most useful
information synergies with the Fed’s monetary policy responsibilities.
8.2 Methodology
Previous work by Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a,b) has found that
conﬁdential supervisory information substantially reduces the forecast er-
rors made by private forecasters who do not have access to this informa-
tion. However, they did not examine whether the usefulness of supervisory
information varied across the three dimensions focused on here: bank
charter, size of banking organization, and BHC aﬃliation. If the value
of bank supervisory data for macroeconomic forecasts varies by type of
institution regulated, then the choice of regulatory structure may impact
the information the Fed has available to conduct monetary policy.
Testing the hypothesis that the information content of bank supervisory
data could vary across groups of banks requires examining the eﬀect on
private forecast errors of a variable that serves as a proxy for those supervi-
sory data. The basic equation takes the form
Xti 	 0 	 1Et,j(Xti: It,j) 	 2Zt  εt,
where Xti is the realized future value in period t  i of the macroeconomic
variable being forecast; Et,j(Xti: It,j) is the expectation of that variable by
forecaster j at time t conditioned on publicly available information at time
t when the forecast is made; and Zt is a proxy variable for the conﬁdential
supervisory data available to bank supervisors at time t. Zt is constructed
using alternative subsets of banks corresponding to regulatory reform pro-
posals. One can then use diﬀerences in the equation standard errors across
equations that diﬀer by including Zts calculated for alternative sets of
banks to identify the set of banks that provides the Fed with the greatest
synergies between bank supervision and the conduct of monetary policy.
This study examines the one-, two-, three-, and four-quarter-ahead fore-
cast errors of inﬂation and unemployment rates of the Federal Reserve’s
own internal forecasts (the Greenbook) and three major commercial fore-
casters: Data Resources, Inc.–McGraw Hill (DRI), Georgia State Univer-
sity (GSU), and the University of Michigan Research Seminar in Quanti-
tative Economics (RSQE). All three private forecasters sell their forecasts
commercially and have generally been among those with the best forecast
record for the macroeconomic variables examined in this study (McNees
1992).
Both RSQE and GSU provide quarterly forecasts that generally are re-
280 Joe Peek, Eric Rosengren, and Geoﬀrey Tootell3. On 1 January 1997 the CAMEL rating system was expanded to CAMELS. The S stands
for “sensitivity to market risk” and is intended to measure how well prepared a bank is to
handle changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity or equity prices. The sample
period for this study ends in 1996:Q2, however.
leased in the middle month of each quarter. The Federal Reserve Green-
book forecasts are at Federal Open Market Committee meeting frequency,
which ensures at least one forecast per quarter. When a quarter contains
more than one Greenbook forecast, we use the one closest to the middle
of the quarter. DRI provides forecasts monthly, and we use its forecast for
the middle month of each quarter so that all forecasters possess roughly
the same information set. The sample period begins in 1978:Q1, because
the CAMEL data ﬁrst became available only in late 1977, and ends in
1996:Q2. However, the GSU forecasts begin only in 1980:Q3.
The measure of conﬁdential supervisory information that we use is
based on the CAMEL ratings used by bank examiners to rate individual
banks. The CAMEL scores given to banks are based on the ﬁve categories
supervisors analyze when evaluating the health of a bank: Capital, Assets,
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity.3 Each bank is rated from 1, the
highest, to 5, the lowest, on each of the component categories and is given
a composite rating. Banks with a rating of 1 (sound in every respect) or 2
(fundamentally sound) are not likely to be constrained in any way by su-
pervisory oversight. For banks witha3r a t i n g( ﬂawed performance), ex-
aminers are likely to raise potential problems, but these problems are usu-
allyviewedasbeingcorrectable.BankswithaCAMELratingof4(potential
forfailure,impairedviability) have a signiﬁcant risk of failure. Banks with
a CAMEL rating of 5 (high probability of failure, severely deﬁcient perfor-
mance) represent the set of banks with the most severe problems.
The variable that serves as a proxy for the conﬁdential bank data avail-
able to the Federal Reserve is the assets of all commercial and savings
banks with a CAMEL rating of 5 measured as a percentage of the total
assetsofallcommercialandsavingsbankswithsupervisoryratings.Weuse
the value for the end of the month prior to the forecast. The aggregate
CAMEL5 measure was found by Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a) to
improve the private-sector and Federal Reserve forecasts of inﬂation and
unemployment rates substantially. If weakness in the banking sector, as in-
dicated by a high percentage of banks with a CAMEL rating of 5, contains
signiﬁcant information about the economy not included in the available
forecasts, the estimated coeﬃcient on CAMEL5 should be positive in the
unemployment rate equation and negative in the inﬂation rate equation.
Weakerbankhealth,measuredasahigherCAMEL5,wouldmeanthatpri-
vate forecasters would overestimate the strength of the economy, and thus
underpredict the unemployment rate and overpredict the rate of inﬂation.
We consider six alternatives for allocating supervisory responsibilities
Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 2814. As discussed in detail in Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a), the standard errors are
corrected using a method devised by Keane and Runkle (1990).
to the Federal Reserve. Supervisory information for the set of all banks
(CAMEL5), as well as for three of the alternatives, serve as the bench-
marks. The results for CAMEL5 can be considered as a comparison of
two extreme proposals: entirely eliminating the Federal Reserve’sr o l ea sa
bank supervisor and assigning the Federal Reserve supervisory authority
over all banks. The other three benchmarks are associated with the set of
banks that the Federal Reserve currently supervises. FRS5 refers to the
supervisory information about the set of state-chartered member banks for
which the Federal Reserve serves as the primary federal regulator. BHC5
corresponds to the set of banks in BHCs for which the Federal Reserve cur-
rently has supervisory responsibilities. FED5 corresponds to the broader
set of banks for which the Federal Reserve has supervisory responsibili-
ties: banks in BHCs plus state-chartered member banks.
The other three alternatives correspond roughly with recent proposals
for restructuring bank supervisory responsibilities. TOP20  SMB corre-
sponds to the set of banks in the twenty largest BHCs plus all state mem-
ber banks. This roughly corresponds to a compromise between the 1994
Treasury proposal and the Federal Reserve’s response to that proposal.
STATE corresponds to the set of state-chartered banks as proposed by the
1991 Treasury study. STATE LEAD corresponds to the set of banks in
BHCs that have a state-chartered bank as the lead bank, plus all state-
chartered banks not in a holding company. This is consistent with the 1984
blueprint for reform proposed by Vice President Bush and the Federal
Reserve response to the 1994 Treasury proposal.
8.3 Empirical Results
Table 8.1 presents the basic results for the aggregate CAMEL5 variable.
This measure of conﬁdential supervisory information makes a signiﬁcant
contribution to the reduction in forecast errors for both unemployment
and inﬂation rates. The estimated eﬀe c ti ss i g n i ﬁcant at all four horizons
for the unemployment rate forecasts and at the three- and four-quarter-
ahead horizons for the inﬂation rate.4 The coeﬃcients are both economi-
cally and statistically signiﬁcant; for example, an increase in CAMEL5 of
1 percentage point, roughly 1 standard deviation, would account for an
underestimation of the four-quarter-ahead unemployment rate of approxi-
mately .25 percentage points.
Table 8.2 contains the results for the unemployment rate when we use
alternative subsets of banks for the calculation of the share of banks with
a CAMEL rating of 5. Equations similar to those in table 8.1 are reestim-
ated with the alternative supervisory information sets in two ways. First,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.we replace the aggregate CAMEL5 measure with the alternative proxy for
bank health. For ease of comparison, we show only the coeﬃcients for the
relevant variables, and the rows containing the estimated coeﬃcients for
the alternative proxies are in bold face. Second, we include the alternative
proxy as an additional explanatory variable in the basic equation that in-
cludes the aggregate CAMEL5 measure. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation can be
used to determine if conﬁdential supervisory information for a speciﬁc
subset of banks can make a signiﬁcant contribution to reducing forecast
e r r o r s .T h es e c o n ds p e c i ﬁcation addresses a diﬀerent issue: whether the
conﬁdential supervisory information for the speciﬁc subset of banks diﬀers
from that contained in the aggregate CAMEL5 measure for the en-
tire set of CAMEL-rated banks. We have calculated all shares using total
assets in CAMEL-rated institutions as the denominator to compare the
estimatedcoeﬃcientsmoreeasily.However,theresultsareunaﬀected(other
than the size of the estimated coeﬃcients) when the denominator of the
ratio is the sum of assets for the same subset of banks used for the calcula-
tion of the numerator.
The ﬁrst two speciﬁcations shown in the table examine whether the
conﬁdential information about banks currently supervised by the Federal
Reserve provides information that would improve the forecasts of the un-
employment rate. The ﬁrst proxy, FED5, is measured as the assets in insti-
tutions with CAMEL ratings of 5 that are supervised by the Federal Re-
serve, divided by total assets in all CAMEL-rated banks. This includes
any bank that is in a holding company plus any other bank that has the
Federal Reserve as its primary regulator (i.e., has a state charter and is a
member of the Federal Reserve System). When FED5 replaces CAMEL5,
the estimated coeﬃcients are positive at each horizon and signiﬁcant for
the one- and two-quarter-ahead forecasts, and they just miss being signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level for the other two horizons. Thus, the information
about banks with a CAMEL rating of 5 that the Federal Reserve currently
regulates can improve signiﬁcantly on forecasts of the unemployment rate.
The positive sign on the estimated coeﬃc i e n ti n d i c a t e st h a ta sal a r g e r
share of Fed-supervised bank assets is accounted for by banks with a
CAMEL rating of 5, the unemployment rate rises relative to forecasts,
indicating that forecasters overpredict the strength of the economy. How-
ever, when both FED5 and CAMEL5 are included in the equation, neither
has a signiﬁcant estimated eﬀect, likely due to the collinearity between the
two measures.
Thesecond speciﬁcation of table 8.2 contains results for the bank health
proxy (FRS5) constructed for the set of banks that have the Federal Re-
serve as their primary federal regulator. The results are weaker than those
for FED5. When FRS5 is included without CAMEL5, the estimated co-
eﬃcients have the predicted positive sign only for the one- and two-
quarter-ahead forecasts, and the eﬀe c ti ss i g n i ﬁcant only for the one-
Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 285quarter-ahead speciﬁcation. When CAMEL5 is also included in the equa-
tion, its estimated eﬀect remains signiﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃcient on
FRS5 is negative at each horizon and signiﬁcant at the four-quarter-ahead
horizon. Thus, the supervisory information for state member banks ap-
pears to be much less useful for unemployment rate forecasts compared to
that for the combination of banks in holding companies plus state member
banks, indicating that the additional supervisory responsibilities over
holding companies contribute information that can strengthen the Federal
Reserve’s ability to conduct monetary policy.
Although supervisory information for the set of banks the Federal Re-
serve does supervise (based on the current regulatory structure) provides
some improvement over the information available to private forecasters
that do not have access to conﬁdential supervisory information, the Fed-
eral Reserve may not regulate the set of banks providing the information
that can most improve the forecasts. The next four speciﬁcations shown in
the table investigate the value of conﬁdential supervisory information re-
lated to four alternative proposals for the set of banks to be supervised by
the Federal Reserve. The third speciﬁcation analyzes the proposal giving
the Fed all banks in BHCs (BHC5). When BHC5 is included without
CAMEL5, three of the four estimated coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, with the
fourth narrowly missing being signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Given the
extensive overlap with the set of all banks, it should not be surprising that
when CAMEL5 is included, neither BCH5 nor CAMEL5 has an individ-
ual eﬀect that is signiﬁcant at any of the four horizons.
The fourth speciﬁcation shows the results for the set of banks in the
twenty largest holding companies plus all state member banks
(TOP20SMB). Interestingly, when the Federal Reserve retains supervi-
sory responsibility over only the largest holding companies (plus state
member banks), the value of supervisory information deteriorates substan-
tially compared to that contained in BHC5. The estimated coeﬃcient on
TOP20SMB is not signiﬁcant for any horizon when CAMEL5 is omitted
from the equation. Furthermore, when CAMEL5 is included in the equa-
tion, it has an estimated eﬀect that is signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst three horizons.
Thus, it appears that supervisory information about banks in holding com-
panies other than the twenty largest contains information that is more use-
ful for improving forecasts compared to that for the largest bank holding
companies. This evidence suggests that the set of institutions that pose
systemic risks may not substantially overlap with the set of banks for
which supervisory information is most valuable for improving unemploy-
ment rate forecasts.
The next alternative measure of bank health considered is for the subset
of banks consisting of all state-chartered banks (STATE) to determine the
extent to which the information synergies between bank supervision and
the conduct of monetary policy varies by bank charter type. When esti-
286 Joe Peek, Eric Rosengren, and Geoﬀrey Tootellmated without CAMEL5, the coeﬃcients on STATE are signiﬁcant for the
three shorter horizons, indicating that supervisory information about this
subset of banks does contribute to the reduction in forecast errors for the
unemployment rate. When CAMEL5 is included, its coeﬃc i e n ti ss i g n i ﬁ-
cant for the one-quarter-ahead horizon and none of the STATE eﬀects
are signiﬁcant.
The last alternative measure is a minor variation of STATE, with the
subset of banks including any bank in a holding company with a state-
chartered lead bank plus any state-chartered bank not in a holding com-
pany (STATE LEAD). The results are essentially the same as for the
STATE speciﬁcation. When CAMEL5 is excluded from the regression,
STATE LEAD has a signiﬁcant eﬀect for the three shortest horizons.
When CAMEL5 is included, STATE LEAD provides no useful informa-
tion that diﬀers from that contained in CAMEL5.
Table 8.3 contains the results for the inﬂation rate forecast equations
corresponding to those reported in table 8.2 for the unemployment rate.
When CAMEL5 is not included in the regression, the estimated coeﬃcient
on FED5 has the expected negative sign, but is never signiﬁcant. When
CAMEL5 is included, it has the predicted negative eﬀect with all but that
for the one-quarter-ahead horizon being signiﬁcant. The estimated co-
eﬃcient on FED5 becomes positive and, for three of the four horizons, is
slightly larger than that for CAMEL5 (in absolute value), indicating a net
eﬀect for FED5 that is positive. In contrast, the estimated coeﬃcients for
FRS5 are not only negative, but are signiﬁcant for the two- and three-
quarter-ahead horizons. When CAMEL5 is included, it has the expected
negative eﬀect but is signiﬁcant only at the four-quarter-ahead horizon.
Furthermore, with CAMEL5 included, FRS5 retains its negative eﬀect.
Thus, for inﬂation forecasts, FRS5 appears to be relatively more informa-
tive than FED5, even though FED5 dominated FRS5 for unemployment
rate forecasts.
Among the other four alternative subsets of banks considered, the
BHC5 results are essentially the same as those for FED5, an unsurprising
result given the extensive overlap across the two sets of banks. On the
other hand, TOP20SMB has estimated coeﬃcients that are positive for
three of the four horizons, although never signiﬁcant. When CAMEL5 is
included, it has estimated coeﬃcients of the predicted negative sign that
are signiﬁcant for the three- and four-quarter-ahead horizons and is close
to signiﬁcance for the two other horizons. Unlike with BHC5 and FED5,
however, no estimated eﬀects of TOP20SMB are signiﬁcant when
CAMEL5 is included in the regression.
The two speciﬁcations based on the subset of state-chartered banks ap-
pear to be the most informative for reducing the forecast errors for the
inﬂation rate. For both STATE and STATE LEAD, the estimated coeﬃ-
cients always have the predicted negative sign, and they are signiﬁcant for









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.all but the one-quarter-ahead horizon, with or without the inclusion of
CAMEL5. In fact, when CAMEL5 is included, its eﬀe c ti sn e v e rs i g n i ﬁ-
cant. Thus, it appears that for inﬂation rate forecasts, the conﬁdential su-
pervisory information about state-chartered banks contains most of the
useful information contained in the aggregate CAMEL5 measure.
Table 8.4 provides a comparison of the equation standard errors across
thealternativespeciﬁcationsforthesetofFederalReserveGreenbookfore-
casts. The errors for this forecast alone are used because the loss to mone-
tary policy is being examined. In each instance, the equation standard
errors are measured as a percentage of that for the speciﬁcation that ex-
cludes conﬁdential supervisory information (BASE). Each regression con-
tains a constant term, the forecast, and the indicated CAMEL rating mea-
sure for a particular set of banks. A value equal to or greater than unity
indicates that the conﬁdential information contained in the particular
measure of bank health does not improve upon the standard forecasts that
d on o tr e l yo nc o n ﬁdential supervisory information.
The aggregate CAMEL5 measure reduces the equation standard errors
for the Greenbook forecasts by 5 to 9 percent in the unemployment rate
e q u a t i o n sa n db y1t o4p e r c e n ti nt h ei n ﬂation rate equations. Although
the supervisory information about the set of banks the Federal Reserve
currently supervises (FED5) improves the unemployment rate forecasts,
the contribution is less than that achieved by CAMEL5, except for the
one-quarter-ahead horizon. On the other hand, for inﬂation rate forecasts,
the supervisory information contained in FED5 contributes to a reduction
in forecast errors only for the one-quarter-ahead horizon. Further limiting
the information to that about the set of banks for which the Federal Re-
serve is the primary federal regulator (FRS5) essentially eliminates any
reduction in forecast errors for the unemployment rate. The reduction in
the standard error compared to the BASE speciﬁcation is less than 0.5
percent for the one- and four-quarter-ahead horizons, with no improve-
ment for the other two horizons. For the inﬂation forecasts, this measure
reduces the standard error by less than 3 percent for the two-quarter-ahead
forecast and by less than 2 percent for the one- and three-quarter-ahead
forecasts, with no improvement for the four-quarter-ahead forecast. Thus,
supervisory knowledge about the institutions that have the Fed as their
primary regulator provides little useful information that could improve
forecasts of the inﬂation and unemployment rates.
One of the contentious issues in rearranging supervisory responsibility
is whether the Federal Reserve should continue to supervise BHCs. When
the supervisory information set is limited to that about banks in BHCs,
the improvement in the equation standard error for the unemployment rate
ranges from 3 to 4 percent, except for the 9 percent improvement for the
one-quarter-ahead horizon. Thus, the improvement at the one-quarter-
ahead horizon is roughly the same as for the aggregate CAMEL5 measure,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and substantially less for the other three horizons. For the inﬂation rate,
BHC5 provides a 1 percent reduction in the equation standard error at the
one-quarter-ahead horizon and no improvement at the other three ho-
rizons.
It is possible that the information content in BHC5 is all coming from
the larger institutions. If so, the set of institutions that pose systemic risks
would overlap with those institutions that provided conﬁdential supervi-
sory information useful for forecasting inﬂation and unemployment. How-
ever, when supervisory information about only the top twenty holding
companies plus state member banks is used, the equation standard errors
forthe unemploymentrateare reducedby onlyabout1 percentateach hor-
izon, and there is no improvement at any horizon for the inﬂation rate
forecasts.
The two measures based on supervisory information about state-
chartered banks tend to dominate all of the other alternatives. Thus, if in-
formation synergies were the criteria, splitting supervisory responsibility
by charter type rather than by whether the bank is in a holding company
would be preferred. For the unemployment rate, they produce the largest
reduction in the equation standard error at the two-, three-, and four-
quarter-ahead horizons among all the alternatives, and even outperform
the aggregate CAMEL5 measure at the two-quarter-ahead horizon. How-
ever, at the one-quarter-ahead horizon, both FED5 and BHC5, as well as
CAMEL5, produce larger reductions in the equation standard error. On
the other hand, for the inﬂation rate equations, STATE and STATE LEAD
produce equation standard errors that are smaller than those for any of
the other alternatives, as well as for aggregate CAMEL5.
8.4 Transferability of Supervisory Information
If supervisory information could be comprehensively transferred with-
out loss of information, the Federal Reserve would not need to be directly
involved in supervising banks. Any synergies with monetary policy, or for
that matter with the discount window or the payments system, could be
exploited using regular, timely reports on bank condition provided to the
Federal Reserve by the primary bank regulators. However, in practice this
is likely to result in some loss of information.
First, highly conﬁdential information is not easily shared across bureau-
cracies. In fact, even within a bureaucracy, it is often diﬃcult to share
conﬁdential information. As Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a) discuss,
economists at the Federal Reserve engaged in economic forecasting gen-
erally do not have access to conﬁdential bank supervisory information.
Thus, even within an organization, it can be diﬃcult for the right individu-
als to gain access to useful supervisory information.
Second, supervisory information is useful to the Federal Reserve only if
Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 291the Fed understands how the rating is formulated and how the rating pro-
cess may be changing over time. Furthermore, the Fed needs to know
whether there are other variables or supervisory practices that may impact
the quality or interpretation of the information provided by other bank
supervisors. Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a) show that supervisory
ratings may vary across size of institution, and Berger, Kyle, and Scalise
(chap. 9, this volume) provide evidence that ratings vary over time. Thus,
hands-on experience in bank supervision enables the Federal Reserve to
identify nuances in the bank supervisory process, as well as in bank health.
Third, other bank supervisors may have objective functions that diﬀer
from those of the central bank. Whereas a bank supervisor may be focused
on factors aﬀecting the probability of an individual bank failing, the cen-
tral bank may be more concerned with systemic risks. Thus, collecting
data on concentration of exposures, how these exposures vary across the
banking system, and how they may impact other ﬁnancial institutions may
be of greater interest to the central bank. This becomes particularly impor-
tant when requests for detailed information on bank portfolios are viewed
as a regulatory burden to the banks and when evaluating that information
may be costly in terms of bank examiner resources. Similarly, the central
bank may be more interested in data that improve its ability to forecast
the macroeconomy and that may be less directly relevant for pure safety
and soundness considerations at the individual bank level. Thus, the avail-
ability of supervisory information that has synergies with monetary policy
and the discount window function may require some direct involvement in
the supervisory process by the central bank.
8.5 Conclusion
Recent research by Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a,b) has estab-
lished that conﬁdential supervisory information can be used to improve
the conduct of monetary policy. This paper explores the implications of
these ﬁndings for the structure of bank regulation. We ﬁnd that supervi-
sory information from Federal Reserve–regulated banks does improve
macroeconomic forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment rates. However,
the greatest information synergies with monetary policy are from state-
chartered banks. Thus, regulatory proposals that would focus regulatory
powers of the Federal Reserve only on BHCs or on large, internationally
active banks may sacriﬁce some information useful for monetary policy.
Loss of regulatory powers would imply a loss of synergies with monetary
policy only if the information were no longer easily transmitted to policy
makers. Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a) and Berger, Kyle, and Scal-
ise (chap. 9, this volume) provide some evidence that hands-on experience
with institutions may be necessary. Central to the Federal Reserve’sp r o -
posals for regulatory reform is that the Federal Reserve maintains hands-
292 Joe Peek, Eric Rosengren, and Geoﬀrey TootellBen S. Bernanke is the Howard Harrison and Gabrielle Snyder Beck Professor of Econom-
ics and Public Aﬀairs at Princeton University. He is also a research associate and director of
the Monetary Economics Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
on experience. As Chairman Alan Greenspan testiﬁed, “Without the
hands-on experience of regulation and supervision, and the exposure to
the operations of banks and markets provided by such experience, the
Federal Reserve’s essential knowledge base would atrophy” (Greenspan
1994, 88). If synergies to monetary policy were part of this essential knowl-
edge base, any proposal for regulatory structure reform would need to
include the smaller banks that have provided the greatest improvement for
forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment rates.
Of course, a variety of other factors should be important for determining
optimal bank regulatory structure. Concerns with providing lender-of-
last-resort functions, potential concerns with systemic risk, potential cost
savings, and concerns with the regulatory burden on ﬁnancial services
ﬁrms, as well as many other issues, should also shape the debate on opti-
mal regulatory structure. However, this research indicates that there is po-
tentially a cost to monetary policy if the central bank is excluded from
participation in bank regulation in general, or even if central bank over-
sight is limited only to the largest institutions.
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Comment Ben S. Bernanke
This interesting paper is motivated by an important, broader issue: namely,
whether central banks should be involved in bank supervision as well as
in monetary policy. The issue is of practical relevance, as several countries
Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 293around the world have recently either eliminated or diluted the authority
of their central banks over the bank supervisory process.
In a number of recent papers, Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell have raised
a novel argument for a continued role for central banks in bank supervi-
sion. Their argument is that conﬁdential supervisory reports provide infor-
mation that is potentially valuable for forecasting key macroeconomic
variables, so that access to this information may help improve the conduct
of monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, they have provided empirical evidence
for the United States that a relatively simple measure of banking system
health—the share of banking assets held by poorly rated banks (i.e., those
with a CAMEL rating of 5)—improves forecasts of inﬂation and unem-
ployment at one, two, three, and four quarters, relative to projections made
by private forecasting concerns and by the Fed itself. Further—and this is
the main contribution of the present paper—the greatest forecasting value
appears to lie in information about the condition of state-chartered banks.
These ﬁndings are intriguing and worthy of further exploration. In par-
ticular, the result that the most useful information comes from supervi-
sion of state-chartered banks—which tend to be small and not publicly
traded—makes a good deal of sense. Having said that, I am not yet con-
vinced that this line of argument is of ﬁrst-order importance in the debate
about the Fed’s appropriate role in bank supervision. In the remainder of
this comment I explain why (for now at least) I would prefer not to rely on
the authors’ argument as an important pillar of the case for Fed involve-
ment in bank supervision. I then take the opportunity to discuss brieﬂy
the broader issue of what the Fed’s role should be.
My reservations about the authors’ argument, at least as it stands at the
present juncture, are as follows:
First, I think that regulatory design ought to be based on durable, well-
established facts and principles, of which the long and varied history of
central banking has provided many. Although the PRT regressions are sug-
gestive, they are of necessity somewhat contingent, being based on limited
information and a limited sample. Obviously, future studies might produce
diﬀerent results. To illustrate my concern, suppose for the sake of argu-
ment that, based on these ﬁndings, we were to give the Fed responsibility
for supervising state-chartered banks. Then suppose that a future set of
regressions were to show that the most valuable information comes from
(say) national banks, or, alternatively, that there is no longer marginal fore-
casting value in supervisory information. Would we then be prepared to
change the regulatory design? This is not really a criticism of Peek, Rosen-
gren, and Tootell, who deserve much credit for opening this line of re-
search. My point is only that, as long as the authors’ claims remain better
described as intriguing hypotheses rather than robust facts, we should be
cautious about using these results for regulatory design.
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sory information would lead (or has led) to an economically signiﬁcant
improvement in monetary policy outcomes. In particular, it would be use-
ful to know more about the marginal value of supervisory information for
forecasting, as the force of the authors’ argument depends very much on
the conclusion that this information is potentially highly useful for the Fed.
It is striking that the Fed currently does not seem to make systematic
use of this information in its oﬃcial Greenbook forecasts—though, as the
authors have pointed out in other works, conﬁdential supervisory informa-
tion does seem to aﬀect the votes of Federal Open Market Committee
members in a more informal way. The main evidence on forecast improve-
ment given in the paper is in table 8.4, which shows standard errors for
regressions with and without the CAMEL5 measure. However, these have
the defect of being in-sample comparisons. Out-of-sample forecasting
comparisons would be a useful extension, as would some additional anal-
ysis of the forecast errors. For example, is the marginal forecasting power
of supervisory information (if it survives in an out-of-sample comparison)
concentrated in certain subperiods or certain geographical regions?
Third, the authors acknowledge that their argument depends very much
on the assumption that information cannot be eﬀectively transferred be-
tween agencies, so that unless the Fed itself is the supervisor of banks it
will not have full access to the information relevant to making monetary
policy. Unfortunately, this assumption is by its very nature extremely
diﬃcult to test. The CAMEL5 variable, which Peek, Rosengren, and Too-
tell show contains useful information for forecasting, could itself be easily
transferred from a supervisory agency to the Fed, as could even more de-
tailed quantitative information about bank condition. Thus the authors’
ultimate claim is quite indirect: They must argue that if CAMEL5 contains
information, surely less quantiﬁable information in bank supervision must
exist as well. They give a number of anecdotal examples of imperfect trans-
fers of information between bureaucracies, and conference participants
added more—all of which seem plausible. Nevertheless, it appears that a
leap of faith on this issue is unavoidable. Personally, I think the informa-
tion transfer argument is much stronger in the context of crisis manage-
ment, when highly detailed and complex information must be transferred
quickly. I return to this point later.
To reiterate, my reservations about using the authors’ argument to sup-
port a particular policy conclusion do not detract from my admiration for
their research on this topic. The information content of bank supervisory
reports bears on a variety of issues in macroeconomics and ﬁnance and is
certainly worth studying. I hope the authors will continue to expand and
reﬁne their results in this area.
I turn now, brieﬂy, to the broader issue, of whether the Fed should have
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tral bank in supervision is that monetary policy and banking policy are,
inevitably, closely intertwined and complementary. For example, as was
emphasized by Bagehot and probably earlier authors, both the economy
as a whole and the banking system in particular are strongly aﬀected by
the central bank’s interest rate settings. Moreover, the sensitivity of the
economy to interest rate changes may be aﬀected by the condition of the
banking system (recall the “headwinds” of the early 1990s), and vice versa.
Good interest rate policies therefore require that the central bank take
account of both the state of the economy and the state of the banking
system, as well as their interactions. Taking account of the banking system
in turn requires intimate knowledge of the condition of banks, which can
only be acquired (or so it is claimed) by the central bank’s participation in
the supervisory process. A similar argument applies to discount-window
policy, which aﬀects the money supply (indeed, in the early days of central
banking, discount-window lending was the only way to aﬀect the money
supply) but is also the principal instrument for fulﬁlling the lender-of-last-
resort function for the banking system.
However, although we are accustomed to seeing the Fed and other cen-
tral banks play a supervisory role, there are certainly some considerations
on the other side. One important issue is supervisory eﬃciency. The cur-
rent system, with three supervisors and overlapping jurisdictions, imposes
signiﬁcant costs on both the government and the banks. As the ﬁnancial
system grows larger and more complex, perhaps the most rational solution
would be to have a single, specialist regulatory and supervisory agency
that is responsible for the system as a whole, or at least for the entire
banking system. By avoiding overlap and supervisory fragmentation, by
being cognizant of the interconnections among ﬁnancial institutions and
markets, and by developing a high level of supervisory expertise, such an
agency (it could be argued) would both improve the quality of supervision
and reduce its social costs. Of course, the Fed is a candidate to take on this
“superregulatory” role; but one might respond that giving this portfolio to
the Fed would both invest too much power in one institution and also
distract the Fed from its primary mission of making monetary policy.
Another argument against a bank supervisory role for the Fed is the
potential for moral hazard. To the extent that the Fed has institutional
objectives other than maximizing social welfare, giving the central bank
too broad a range of powers may invite abuse. For example, if the Fed
were anxious to conceal the insolvency of some part of the banking system
(an impulse that we have seen at times in other supervisory agencies), it
might be tempted to distort interest rate policies in a way that increases
bank proﬁts or asset values, at the expense of macroeconomic objectives.
Conversely, it is also possible that the Fed might use its supervisory au-
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make, in order to serve some goal such as providing short-term macroeco-
nomic stimulus or helping bail out a country suﬀering a ﬁnancial crisis.
(Not to say that these are necessarily bad objectives; again, a problem only
arises when the Fed’s institutional priorities diﬀer from those of the society
at large.) At the conference, Charles Calomiris gave a number of possible
examples of such behavior. The temptation to distort supervisory policies
to serve monetary policy objectives, or vice versa, arises of course from
the same complementarities between monetary policy and banking policy
stressed earlier. I think the potential for moral hazard is real and should
be a concern for those who supervise the supervisors. The risk of moral
hazard, by the way, is yet another reason for maximum transparency in
central banking.
So what’s the bottom line? After thinking about both sides of the issue,
and giving due credit to the arguments for regulatory eﬃciency and moral
hazard, my own provisional conclusion is that the Fed should retain its
supervisory powers, and that its supervision should focus on the largest
and most complex banking ﬁrms. The key desideratum, I believe, is the
need to have a competent and highly trusted public institution that is em-
p o w e r e dt od e a le ﬀectively and in a timely way with ﬁnancial crises. The
Fed has certainly established its credibility and competence over a period
of time. Furthermore, because interest rates and discount-window lending
are important instruments for dealing with ﬁnancial crises, and because
crises often have major implications for the economy as a whole, the cen-
tral bank is the natural agency to serve as command central when the
ﬁnancial system threatens to melt down. To fulﬁll this role eﬀectively, the
Fed needs detailed information about not only the general ﬁnancial condi-
tion of the banking system but also about complex ﬁnancial linkages and
the associated vulnerabilities—and it needs to be able to get this informa-
tion within hours or even minutes. A role for the Fed in the supervisory
process is the most direct way to ensure that the necessary information is
available in a crisis.
I would not necessarily rule out future modiﬁcations of the regulatory
design that preserve Fed access to supervisory information. Indeed, it may
be possible to rationalize the system in a way that reduces the regulatory
costs imposed on banks without aﬀecting the information ﬂow (a system
of jointly conducted examinations under a uniform set of regulations
might be worth considering, for example). The Fed should also work as
closely as possible with other regulators, including nonbank regulators
such as the SEC, to improve its information channels. However, because
ﬁnancial crises are dangerous, unpredictable, and not well understood, we
should be extremely cautious about changing a system for dealing with
such crises that has served us well for half a century.
Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 297Discussion Summary
Frederic Mishkin began by asking which kinds of information a lender of
last resort could get if there were no bank examinations. He followed up
by asking about what happens to information ﬂows, especially if the cen-
tral bank is responsible for managing ﬁnancial crises.
Patricia Jackson noted that there could be real information issues when
central banks no longer carry out supervision of banks. She observed that
with in-house information one gets information about interlinkages that
might be important in identifying systemic problems. She noted that the
Bank of England had carried out work to look at the size of exposures
between diﬀerent players in various markets. Central banks needed to con-
sider the likely sources of shocks and the adequacy of capital buﬀers. Fo-
cusing on the recent experience in the United Kingdom, she said that one
should not overemphasize the trend toward the separation of supervision
and central banking. She noted that England is the only country in the G7
where the monetary authority is not involved at all in prudential super-
vision or linked to the prudential supervisor. For the United Kingdom it
meant that the supervisor and central bank needed to work closely to-
gether and share information. Lastly, about the results in the paper, Jack-
son observed that the lags in economic data are substantial. The Bank of
England has regional representatives to gather more immediate informa-
tion on the economy at a regional level. Maybe it is this type of informa-
tion that the CAMEL ratings pick up.
Stephen Cecchetti suggested that the authors look out of sample and at
other data to see if market information, for example, might be a good
predictor. He also noted that the conﬂict of interest argument might be
overstated. He pointed out that a ﬁnancial system collapse would also be
bad for macroeconomic stability. Discount loans are 100 percent collater-
alized, although there are a few extreme exceptions. Finally, he noted that
it might be useful to separate regulation, supervision, and consumer pro-
tection.
Mark Carey noted that crisis intervention is a key role of the monetary
authority and that this is often done through the banks. He emphasized
that the monetary authority needs a credible threat because banks will
want others to bear the responsibility. He observed that central bank inde-
pendence gets supervisors’ independence. He concluded by noting that it
is also desirable to have multiple supervisors to ﬁlter out bad ideas.
Laurence Meyer began by noting that the paper tries to rationalize a
Byzantine structure. He noted that it is important for the agencies to co-
operate to limit regulatory burden on the banks. He observed that regula-
tory competition may be good in any areas, but the downside to compe-
tition is the potential for a race to the bottom. He agreed with Ben
Bernanke, the discussant, that supervisors should be structured to max-
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Federal Reserve to have a good relationship with the OCC. Picking up on
other comments, he argued that the recapitalization of the banking system
w a sn o tac o n ﬂict of interest but was complementary. Finally, he asked
whether one wants a supervisory authority with no macroeconomic re-
sponsibility.
Randy Kroszner observed that if the rationalization for having the mone-
tary authority and bank supervisor under one roof is the role of the Fed-
eral Reserve as crisis manager, then we should not stop at banking. He
noted that the key is to have coordination.
Andrew Powell observed that the information from the tequila crisis was
that information ﬂows were the key, although he noted that Venezuela was
a counterexample. He followed up on earlier remarks and pointed out that
regulation and supervision could be separate. He observed that this sepa-
ration might enable policy to break down some resistance from supervi-
sors. He concluded by noting that in the end ﬁnancial regulation should
be independent.
James Wilcox noted that the question of many supervisory agencies is a
little diﬀerent from where supervision is housed, but he wondered whether
competition and separation were ineﬃcient. He noted that multiple super-
visors might not give consistent answers, as evidenced by the Berger, Kyle,
and Scalise paper. He also wondered how well information travels. He
noted that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have been able to coordi-
nate their activities during currency-related crises. Finally, he noted that,
given the new rules from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as insurance and
security companies come into the new ﬁnancial holding companies, the
Federal Reserve will need to rely more heavily on insurance regulators and
the SEC.
Robert Eisenbeis asked a number of questions about the authors’ data
and results. First, he asked over what time horizon the forecasts were com-
pared. He suggested that the relevant forecast horizon might be longer
than one quarter. Second, he asked about the data vintage: Were the au-
thors using the ﬁnal or revised data? He also asked how much the addition
of the regulatory information improved the precision of the forecasts. Fi-
nally, referring back to comments from Ben Bernanke, he noted that the
mix of goals is complex. He observed that it is not always true that inter-
nalizing the resolution of conﬂict is good, because goals may have diﬀer-
ent primacy.
Charles Calomiris noted that the race to the bottom for regulatory com-
petition might be avoided. He argued that regulators might be too risk
averse and that they may resist beneﬁcial deregulation in the absence of
regulatory competition. He noted that in the United States deregulation
was partly a product of such competition. With respect to political pres-
sure, he noted that there are a number of cases from recent history in
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on board. One example he pointed to is the link between bank merger and
Community Reinvestment Act policy.
Allen Berger concluded the comments by noting that, as the authors
acknowledge, a crucial aspect of the argument is that there must be more
information from the exam process than just the CAMEL rating to justify
the combination of supervision and central banking. He pointed out that
a bank exam goes beyond balance sheet information. He observed that
communication from bankers may be key, as was the case in the credit
crunch where bankers recognized the diﬃculties ﬁrst.
Eric Rosengren began by responding to a number of the technical and
data suggestions. He noted that they did look at public information such
as call report information and interest rate spreads and that their results
did not change signiﬁcantly. He observed that this is further evidence that
private information matters for forecasting. He also noted that they had
split the sample. He pointed out that looking at the performance of the
model out of sample would be diﬃcult given the recent experience of few
poor CAMEL ratings. He noted that the authors were in the process of
developing a panel data set of GDP forecasts, but that this can be chal-
lenging given the revisions to the data. He also noted that they had looked
at forecasts from one to four quarters ahead. Finally, he observed that the
authors’ Quarterly Journal of Economics paper discusses both the statisti-
cal and economic signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings.
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